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Abstract 
Recent crisis responses, including the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
United States (U.S.) integrated response to the 7.0-magnitude earthquake in Haiti, in 
which the DoD played a major role, can be examined and analyzed to determine 
how greater efficiencies and effectiveness may be achieved. Specific examination 
and analysis of actual logistics and contract capability in real-world response, 
including the DoD’s ability to deliver the right mix of goods and services when and 
where they are needed given limited resources, can be utilized to create a more 
robust capability for future events including the ability to react more effectively and 
efficiently within the constraints of resources such as budget and manpower if 
contingency contracting is in place. We examine the planning and management of 
the DoD’s logistics and contracting support for contingency, expeditionary, and crisis 
response, and provide specific recommendations for optimizing response capability 
for future disaster relief.  
Keywords:  crisis response, actual logistics, real-world response, planning and 
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I. Introduction 
In the last few years, a substantial amount of the population of the world has 
suffered due to disasters, natural and manmade. In 2009, there were 335 natural 
disasters reported worldwide that killed 10,655 persons, affected more than 119 
million others, and caused over $41.3 billion in economic damages (Vos, Rodriguez, 
Below, & Guha-Sapir, 2009).  Recent crisis responses, including the DoD and U.S. 
integrated response to the 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti, in which the DoD 
played a major role, can be examined and analyzed to determine how greater 
efficiencies and effectiveness may be achieved. Currently, there exists a sub-
optimization of capability due to the lack of an integrated analytical approach to 
creating and executing crisis response. The study of natural disasters such as the 
earthquake in Haiti, Hurricane Katrina in the United States, the tsunami in the Indian 
Ocean, the earthquake in Pakistan, and numerous humanitarian challenges arising 
from such conflicts as that in Sudan have exposed the shortcomings in planning for 
disasters. The homeland security issues related to domestic as well as international 
terrorism have made “readiness” the principal priority. 
 Humanitarian logistics is a critical element of an effective and efficient 
disaster relief process (Apte, 2009) that is manifest in long lead-times and high costs 
in the acquisition and delivery of critical supplies and services in areas devastated 
by disaster.  The negative effects of the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of existing 
systems are felt throughout the lifecycle of the disaster after it strikes. The lifecycle 
of a disaster can be divided into three stages along a time line (see Figure 1): 
preparedness efforts before the disaster strikes, response immediately after the 
disaster strikes, and recovery in the post-disaster period (Apte, 2009).    
When a disaster strikes, the response follows: donations and funding are 
solicited from donors, and sometimes supplies are obtained from pre-contracted 
vendors. Sometimes the supplies are obtained in advance, especially during the pre-
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from vendors are then transported by various means to predetermined locations and 
distributed by emergency responders in the affected areas. However, the nature of 
the events creates uncertainties. It is therefore critical that logistics and contracting 
have to create an efficient interface. The complexity of humanitarian logistics can be 
appreciated when the distribution process through the time line of Humanitarian 
Supply Chain, along with the factors and characteristics of this supply chain are 
taken into account.  
 
Figure 1. Time Line of Humanitarian Supply Chain 
 
Specific examination and analysis of actual logistics and contract capability in 
real-world response, including the DoD’s ability to deliver the right mix of goods and 
services when and where they are needed given limited resources, can be utilized to 
create a more robust capability for future events including the ability to react more 
effectively and efficiently within the constraints of resources such as budget and 
manpower if contingency contracting is in place. 
Examination of the DoD’s crisis response capability indicates that the overall 
supply chain can be improved (Lodree & Taskin, 2009) if the logistics and 
contracting communities collaborate. Specifically, the response time, coordination of 
providers, contracting, and the capability to deliver the right mix of goods and 
services can be enhanced.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2008, 
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international disasters must be improved.  This call for improved coordination to 
better response extends to the logistics and contracting support communities within 
the DoD and can be a key enabler for initial response improvement.  
In Haiti, devastation caused by the earthquake dramatically impaired the 
capability of all rapid response efforts.  The resulting extreme conditions made it 
difficult to deliver and transport much needed equipment, materials, supplies, and 
services to the Haiti earthquake victims and the first responders on the scene. This 
study examines how planners and coordinators within DoD contracting and logistics 
provided relief to those in Haiti.  Additionally, a comparative analysis of recent DoD 
humanitarian assistance operations discloses best practices in DoD disaster relief as 
this study uncovers what went right, what went wrong, and what was learned in the 
first critical hours of the Haiti relief effort. 
A gap exists in coordinating the capabilities of logistics agencies and 
contracting communities. The questions that need to be answered are as follows: 
Are there any examples of effective and efficient logistics and contingency 
contracting support? Can we draw any conclusions from the 2010 Haiti disaster and 
Operation Unified Response (OUR)? How was the support used to mitigate the 
devastation in Haiti? Were there any specific influential factors that affected the 
coordination between these two communities? Were logistics and contracting staff 
integrated in the operational planning phase? Overall, what were the overarching 
logistics and contracting challenges? 
We set out to answer these questions based on academic literature, official 
documents, and field research. In this article, our next section reviews the literature. 
In the following sections we discuss various aspects of logistics and contingency 
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II. Literature Review 
Previous to  Haiti Earthquake, humanitarian groups and governments have 
shown a simple lack of preparation in combating the effects of the disaster (McCoy, 
2008).  Logistical obstacles have created greater suffering and have highlighted the 
ineffectiveness caused by a lack of preparedness.  Humanitarian groups have not 
shown significant coordination and communication within organizations.  However, 
the fact remains that all organizations, or groups within the organization, must 
coordinate their efforts amongst response providers in order to achieve the greatest 
effect.  Oftentimes, lack of coordination causes further problems when certain areas 
become over serviced and other areas are under serviced.  The lack of planning and 
coordination leads to information gaps and the unclear assignment of participant 
responsibilities, which negatively affects vital support.  As coordination strengthens 
and improves, duplicative and surplus operations can be eliminated and response 
efficiency and effectiveness improved.   For the purposes of this work the authors 
define “effectiveness” as providing the needed support at the right place and right 
time, whereas “efficiency” is providing effective support in the most economic 
manner possible (considering cost, manpower, and other resources).There are 
many lessons to be learned from models developed in academic literature, case 
studies described by practitioners, and official documents explaining military 
missions. 
A. Academic Literature 
 Logisticians play a vital role in almost all aspects of society, especially so in 
disaster relief zones (Thomas, 2003).  Logistics is the life of any emergency aid 
operation and without it lives will be lost.  Usually logistics is where many relief 
operations struggle or even fail.  Proper coordination between agencies requires 
adequate preparation before a disaster, when a coordinated logistics plan can 
alleviate inadequacies.  In addition, humanitarian supply chains are very dynamic 
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Logistics is viewed as a support function and not a strategic function within 
organizations.  Inadequate consideration and placement within organizations often 
leads to underfunding and under resourcing, resulting in inferior logistics and 
contracting support provided by the organization.  Often, logisticians are even left 
out of the planning process and therefore resort to reactionary measures and 
support a constant state of “fire fighting” during a crisis.  
There are substantial differences between commercial logistics and 
humanitarian logistics.  Humanitarian logistics need to have zero lead times, are 
often high stakes, sometimes utilize unreliable information, are often ad hoc in many 
organizations, and utilize varying levels of enabling technology (Beamon, 1999) that 
is vital due to the unpredictable nature of humanitarian logistics.  Logistics must be 
adaptive and flexible when operating in a disaster area, unlike the familiarity of 
commercial logistics. 
Private sector logistics can and should be applied to improve the performance 
of disaster logistics, but before embarking on this endeavor the private sector needs 
to understand the core capabilities of humanitarian logistics (Van Wassenhove, 
2005).  With this in mind, this paper walks us through the complexities of managing 
supply chains in emergency relief operations as well as the possibilities of becoming 
involved through corporate social responsibility. It also outlines strategies for better 
preparedness and the need for supply chains to be agile, adaptable, and aligned—a 
core competency of many humanitarian organizations involved in disaster relief and 
an area that the private sector could draw on to improve their own competitive edge.   
The speed of humanitarian aid after a disaster depends on the capability of 
logisticians to acquire, transport, and receive supplies at the site of humanitarian 
relief effort (Koavacs & Spens, 2007).  The authors create a framework that 
distinguishes between the actors, phases, and logistical processes of disaster relief.  
The authors define humanitarian logistics as the different operations at different 
times that occur to aid and help those affected by various catastrophes, which could 
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Furthermore, they define disaster management as a process of several 
stages in order to implement humanitarian logistics.  These stages are preparing for 
the disaster, immediate disaster response, and reconstruction.  In the preparing 
phase, the authors make the argument that the prevention and prediction of 
disasters are nearly impossible, thus creating planning difficulty. Disasters are 
unpredictable with the exception of possible manmade disasters (such as war, 
terrorism, etc.); however, sufficient preparation can be made due to the likelihood of 
a disaster occurring, such as preparing for earthquakes in fault zones, volcanic 
activity in cities near volcanoes, or hurricanes in hurricane-prone regions.    
Preparedness has been crucial in many of these areas and the lack of preparedness 
is evident in those areas not prepared.  Of note is that Kovacs and Spens (2007) 
determined that a significant portion of planning for disasters lacked foresight into 
logistics and simply focused on reactionary measures such as evacuation routes.  
Prepositioning is the key to effective and efficient disaster response. The 
most common perceptions about prepositioning are “stockpiles” of critical supplies. 
Two other important aspects included in prepositioning for readiness are the 
contracting support for logistics, discussed in this paper, and the capacity expansion 
discussed by Salmeron and Apte (2010). Salmeron and Apte (2010) developed a 
two-stage stochastic optimization model to address shortcomings in current pre-
disaster planning for humanitarian logistics. A key strategic issue is the pre-
establishment of adequate capacity and resources that enable efficient relief 
operations. The optimization focuses on minimizing the expected number of 
casualties; therefore, our model includes first-stage decisions to represent the 
expansion of resources such as warehouses, medical facilities with personnel, ramp 
spaces, and shelters. Second-stage decisions concern the logistics of the problem, 
where allocated resources and contracted transportation assets are deployed to 
rescue critical population (in need of emergency evacuation), the delivery 
requirements of commodities to the stay-back population, and the transport of the 
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In addition to the strategic issues, the main operational problem that exists 
relates to distribution.  Balcik, Beamon, and Smilowitz (2008) made the argument for 
a centralized distribution system consisting of various nodes spread across a 
network implemented within the affected region.  This network would aid in 
coordination by providing a systematic model of organization for aid distribution 
utilizing a centralized system.  During a disaster problems arise affecting the 
infrastructure.  These issues were evident in the 2010 Haiti earthquake. However, 
with a lack of such infrastructure, a new solution to move disaster relief supplies 
around the region was needed in Haiti and will be critical for future disasters as well.  
For the most part, the physical delivery of aid is a non-factor due to the ability to air 
drop supplies to even the most remote areas.  There are several factors and 
variables that must be taken into account that determine the means and methods of 
delivery.   
Before the 2010 Haiti earthquake, numerous case studies had pointed out the 
importance of logistics as well as the criticality of coordination amongst agencies 
that are downstream or upstream from the logistics in the entire supply chain. A 7.9-
magnitude earthquake struck Gujarat, India, during a holiday in 2001. This 
earthquake was massive and widespread, and the region’s lack of codes and 
general unpreparedness for the earthquake caused more damage than was 
necessary.  The earthquake’s scale made the implementation of any logistics plan 
difficult.  There was significant use of an Integrated Product Team  (IPT) structure 
consisting of engineers, sanitation experts, earthquake specialists, and health 
experts set up to assess the damage and needs of the resulting humanitarian 
mission (Samii, Van Wassenhove, Kumar, & Becerra-Fernandez, 2002).  The 
logistics unit for this disaster had two separate groups that divided logistics between 
field activity and resource management.  Additionally, they had specialists pertaining 
to planning, coordination, and reporting.  They also had a distribution specialist.  The 
Red Cross had focused on their disaster management capability.  The International 
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as well as numerous well stocked donation centers in order to rapidly deploy 
resources in the event of a disaster.  
By the end of its six-month mandate in Afghanistan, the United Nations Joint 
Logistics Center (UNJLC), an interagency emergency response coordination 
mechanism administered by the Word Food Program (WFP), had accomplished its 
goals (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2003a). It had supported humanitarian logistics 
planners in their efforts throughout the 2001/2002 Afghan winter and had addressed 
cross-border and in-theater logistic bottlenecks.  The UNJLC utilized a pre-planned 
strategy that consisted of pre-positioning aid, ensuring corridor accessibility, and 
developing contingency airlift capacity.   
Relief efforts organized to combat the affects of a quick succession of floods 
in Mozambique (Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2003b) had the problem of which 
humanitarian UN agency or Non-Government Organization (NGO) was supposed to 
coordinate the use of the available air assets. The UNJLC coordinated and 
communicated among the various aid agencies within the affected region.  They 
became the center point for all operations within the region.  This coordination 
reduced the confusion and redundancy of multiple agencies trying to provide aid. 
B. Official Documents 
Recent disasters and the ability to effectively and efficiently respond, has 
spawned several official published works related to disaster response. Of note are 
those from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the GAO, the UN, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the RAND Corporation, and U.S. 
military commands, including the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  Particularly 
noteworthy, is that few official documents deal specifically with logistics and 
contracting as a means to support disaster relief.   Even fewer sources examine or 
champion the integration of logistics and contracting capabilities as an element of 
disaster response posture. Some of the most pertinent of the official documents are 
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The RAND Corporation published a comprehensive, albeit interim work, on 
response capabilities and organizations responsible for response and recovery 
efforts (Moore and Wermuth, 2010).  The RAND study determined that despite clear 
recognition that most disasters occur locally—or at least start that way—most 
attention to date seems to have been on “top-down” planning from the federal level, 
representing stovepipe initiatives from different federal agencies. With that in mind, 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs in the U.S. 
Department of Defense saw an opportunity to strengthen local level disaster 
preparedness planning by military installations and their civilian counterparts—local 
governments and local health-care providers, especially the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs.  The report examines the national policies for preparedness 
planning, preparedness utilizing a notional “risk-informed, capability-based” planning 
framework, local civil and military preparedness, and local support networks.  RAND 
intends to continue research in this area in an effort to create and test a “concept of 
operations” for more coherent response capability.   The proposed model will be 
specifically tailored to U.S. domestic response capability.   However, the current 
report fails to examine or recognize logistics and contracting in their concepts or as 
an element or means of preparedness.  
The GAO in March 2011, published a report describing FEMA’s progress 
(GAO, 2011).  Congress acted to address shortcomings in the preparation for and 
response to Hurricane Katrina that, among other things, gave FEMA responsibility 
for leading the nation in developing a national preparedness system. The Post-
Katrina Act requires that FEMA develop a national preparedness system, assess 
preparedness capabilities, and determine the nation’s preparedness capability levels 
and the resources needed to achieve the desired levels of capability. In September 
2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the National 
Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based 
preparedness as a systematic effort that includes sequential steps to first determine 
capability requirements and then assess current capability levels. According to the 
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choose options to address capability gaps and deficiencies, allocate funds, and 
assess and report the results. This proposed framework reflects critical practices we 
have identified for government performance and results. The report is significant in 
that it emphasizes the need to have measurable and demonstrable metrics to 
determine the state of preparedness and the capability to respond effectively and 
efficiently.  
The GAO, specifically addresses the planning and conduct of contracting in 
relation to Hurricane Katrina (GAO, 2006). The testimony report discusses how three 
agencies—the General Services Administration, FEMA, and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers conducted oversight of key contracts used in response to the hurricanes.  
The GAO found three primary and specific deficiencies.  First, there was inadequate 
planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for needed goods and 
services. Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities across 
agencies and jurisdictions to ensure effective outcomes. And third, there were 
insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective 
contractor oversight.  Mr. Woods recommended several actionable items to remedy 
the deficiencies, including, but not limited to, the need to have competitively awarded 
contracts in place prior to the event against which orders can be placed as needed 
and better pre-planning and communications with other agencies to align 
responsibilities among the key officials in managing the award and oversight of 
contracts.  This testimony is but one of the many reports published by the GAO on 
the Hurricane Katrina response.  In total, there are well over a dozen reports; most 
indicate a lack of planning, coordination, and communication as key problems in 
effective response capability.  
The GAO (GAO-10-364) in its March 2010 report, emphasized a current lack 
of interagency coordination.  The GAO noted that key DoD documents and 
instructions governing the structure of conduct of operations are outdated, not 
integrated with supporting doctrine, and not comprehensive enough to provide clear 
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documents that embody its approach and processes for interagency coordination.  
They recommend creating a single guide for the DoD and other agencies’ 
information that could enhance their mutual understanding and facilitate a unified 
and institutionalized approach to interagency coordination. 
Other GAO Reports may be useful and support our conclusions, including, for 
example, Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military’s Response to 
Catastrophic Natural Disasters (GAO-06-643), Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, 
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System (GAO-06-618), U.S. Southern 
Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response 
Revealed Challenges Conducting Large Military Operations (GAO-10-801). 
A prime example of outdated DoD and service documents that most likely 
need comprehensive updating are the Department of the Army and the U.S. Marine 
Corps’ Field Manual 100-19 Domestic Support Operations (Department of the Army, 
1993).  This is a primary document in the force structure, planning, and conduct of 
domestic operations, including disaster response capabilities on U.S. soil.  The 
manual includes comprehensive chapters on concepts of operations, roles and 
responsibilities, legal considerations, logistics and support operations, community 
assistance, and training and education in domestic support.  Chapter 5 of this 
document, entitled Disasters and Domestic Emergencies, is a comprehensive guide 
on interagency roles and responsibilities, stages of response, and associated 
capabilities.  Despite being authored in 1993, the Army still utilizes this manual, at 
least nominally.  We contend that because many changes have occurred in statutes 
and policies, including revisions to the Stafford Act, this publication should be 
revised to reflect those changes and to include recent recommendations on logistics 
and contracting as required.   
Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support, published in October 
2008, is the first strategic-level DoD publication that addresses planning and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 13 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Operational Contract Support (OCS) document is a result of recognized recent 
failures in combat theater contracting. The failures resulted from a lack of 
comprehensive planning and integration of contracting with logistics and other 
operational elements within the military.  It mandates new protocols and a new 
OPLAN document, Annex W, the Contract Support Integration Plan (CSIP).  A 
hallmark is that the generation of Annex W will require comprehensive analysis of 
logistics and contracting capabilities in harmony with broader Combatant Command 
objectives for a particular operation.  The relevance for this analysis is striking: JP 4-
10, along with some other academic works cited below, call for logistics and 
contracting to conduct an analysis of capability gaps and for determining the optimal 
support package to be iterated within the OPLAN. Joint Publications are strategic-
level guidance that should be utilized to shape planning and operations.  Joint Pub 
4-10, Operational Contract Support, should be examined in the context of other joint 
doctrine publications such as Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Strategic Planning, and Joint Pub 
4-0, Joint Logistics. 
 A three-tiered credentialed-based personnel hierarchy for integrative 
planning, coordination, and execution of contracting operations model (Yoder, 2004)  
proposes that without well-credentialed planners and executors, mission 
accomplishment will be sub-optimized, and better stakeholder integration can only 
be accomplished by having well-credentialed participants at the top tiers of planning 
staffs.  This work was referenced and cited in the Gansler Commission Report, 
(Gansler, 2007) and was briefed to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, among others.  
Another report that is particularly germane to this work (Yoder, 2010) 
demonstrated that improved effectiveness and efficiencies occur when personnel 
specifically credentialed, in accordance with Yoder’s recommendations under the 
Yoder Three-tier Model, are integrated into strategic operations planning and 
execution.  This integration calls specifically for contract and logistics integration in 
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Publication 4-10, discussed earlier (CJCS, 2008).  Yoder contends that significant 
reductions in initial crisis response times can occur when the right mixes of 
credentialed contracting personnel, advanced planning, utilization of the JOPES 
execution platform, and utilization of advanced contracting concepts and protocols 
(some authorized under declared contingencies) are employed in harmony.   A 
quicker and more effective response was demonstrated in a modeling and 
simulation of the Yoder Three-tier Model in combination with Phase Zero advanced 
planning by Poree, K., Curtis, K., Morrill, J., and Sherwood, S. (2008). These proven 
concepts are particularly important in an actual humanitarian crisis event, where the 
works demonstrated that integrated contracting and logistics and advanced planning 
improve response in the event of an actual crisis.   
The Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook (Christianson, A., Coombs, 
J., Harbin, S., Ingram, P., Long, B., Yoder, E. C., (et. al.), 2010, June).  provides a 
solid and fundamental guide for all DoD practitioners for humanitarian and 
expeditionary operations.   In particular, Chapter 9, Domestic and Overseas Disaster 
Response, is wholly dedicated to the topic of contracting for disaster response.  
Within the text, the unique roles of various federal agencies, including FEMA and the 
DoD, are addressed along with the specific roles of the contracting officer and 
unique protocols available in declared emergencies.   However, the book does not 
address contracting and logistics integration specifically, something the authors of 
the Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook intend to include in the 2nd edition, 
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III. Contingency Contracting and Logistics 
The term logistics has different meanings to different organizations and 
people. In the business sector, logistics is defined as a “planning framework for the 
management of material, service, information, and capital flows and includes the 
increasingly complex information, material, communication, and control systems 
required in today’s business environment” (Van Wassenhove, page 476, 2006). 
However, humanitarian organizations agree that humanitarian logistics is “the 
process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost-effective, flow 
and storage of goods and materials, as well as related information, from point of 
origin to point of consumption for the purpose of meeting the end beneficiary’s 
requirements” (Thomas & Mizushima, page 60, 2005). Military logistics sustains 
military operations by looking at strategic logistics such as infrastructure, national 
stockpile, and tactical logistics (Kres, 2002).  
Humanitarian logistics is defined “as that special branch of logistics which 
manages response supply chain of critical supplies and services with challenges 
such as demand surges, uncertain supplies, critical time-windows in face of 
infrastructure vulnerabilities and vast scope and size of the operations” (Apte, page 
12, 2009).  “A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces 
in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and 
order, political instability, or other military operations” (Yoder, 2010). Due to the 
extreme nature of the response, supply chain planners of humanitarian logistics 
must understand that one of the most critical factors in addressing the challenge of 
disaster response is contingency contracting, which is a functional component of 
defense contracting (Obayuwana, S., & Lockett, E., 2011, March).  
Contingency operations span a wide range of military operations that include 
domestic and international disaster relief as well as humanitarian operations. 
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requirements. Logistics being the major part of disaster relief and humanitarian 
operations, contracting to support logistics plays a critical role in such planning. 
If the environment in the host country of disaster is immature in terms of 
infrastructure, governance, and economy, it is all the more essential that contracting 
support be well established for humanitarian logistics to be effective. In Haiti, the 
January 12, 2010, earthquake occurred with a magnitude of 7.0 and an epicenter 10 
miles southwest of the capital of Port-au-Prince; more than 3 million people were 
affected by the disaster.  There were over 230,000 fatalities and 1.2 million 
displaced individuals (USAID/OFDA, 2010). Haiti’s economic plight is rooted in its 
socio-political instability and lack of developed infrastructure. Following the 
earthquake, the first responders had to overcome the inadequate indigenous Haitian 
national response capability. For all practical purposes, communication networks 
were non-existent. The seaport was destroyed and so was the airport control tower. 
The only way to distribute critical supplies was via trucks.  Unfortunately, the drive 
times were three times greater than normal due to traffic jams and impaired road 
networks.  The other possible means of distribution was vertical lift air transport. In 
addition, there were no disaster readiness and preparedness measures in place. 
There were few staff members left to respond to the disaster that were not corrupt or 
ineffective.  
As a lesson from Haiti, and in similar cases, outside response providers have 
an added responsibility to be even more efficient and effective.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that the performance by the DoD be studied to learn from the disaster 
response and implement those lessons the next time around. As understood from 
the Haiti disaster, logistics and contracting support can be studied from initial needs 
assessment, delivery of supplies, and coordination of effort, contracts, and oversight.  
A. Needs Assessment and Delivery 
In Haiti, the immediate needs assessment identified typical requirements 
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food, fuel, water, shelter, and security.  Heavy equipment for construction, barges for 
port services, transportation vehicles, fuel for vehicles, equipment and aircrafts, and 
mobile phones for communications were some of the vital immediate logistics 
requirements during the first critical hours of OUR (Obayuwana, S., & Lockett, E. 
2011, March). 
Although initial requirements were determined by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the specific quantities were unknown, 
primarily because the numbers and locations of casualties and afflicted people were 
constantly changing during the first critical hours of the operation. The USAID’s 
Office of Federal Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is chartered as the “lead” federal 
agency in responding to international disasters and coordinating humanitarian aid 
requests, including making initial assessments.  Normally, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) is the federal government’s lead in domestic disaster 
response and recovery coordination.  In addition, initial phase one response was 
negatively impacted by the lack of clarity in the supporting and supported roles.  
There was confusion as to who the lead organization was, which further extended 
the lead times for getting the “right” requirements to the right place at the right time 
(Obayuwana, S., & Lockett, E. 2011, March). Supplying fuel to Haiti for 
transportation vehicles was a challenge as well. The fuel shortage and the 
destruction of Haiti’s only refinery added to transportation challenges. The lack of 
fuel, inadequate space for offloading and staging cargo, and unclear command, 
control, and communications only aggravated the distribution. 
However, there were some bright spots.  The military indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts and the Navy’s husbanding contracts 
were quick sources of supplies and services, tantamount to a pre-positioned 
capability.  Supplies were also taken off of naval ships, from the U.S. embassy, and 
other assets not pre-designated or specifically slated to respond to contingencies 
within/close to the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Area of 
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Republic and Columbia as well as foreign military, governments, institutions, and 
civilian volunteer entities from other countries.  The Dominican Republic was 
instrumental in getting supplies and services to Haiti mainly because it shares its 
eastern boundary with Haiti and there is ground continuity between them.  Locating 
distribution nodes and obtaining accurate counts of the requiring population location 
was difficult, which added to greater delays and sub-optimization of relief.  Further 
compounding problems for initial providers, was the poor labeling and identification 
of humanitarian rations.  This lack of clear labeling slowed the distribution process 
due to the providers’ need to sort through hundreds, if not thousands, of pallets of 
commodities that were arriving on scene awaiting further distribution.  
B. Coordination of Efforts 
Within the first critical hours of OUR and throughout much of the time that 
followed, the coordination efforts between the DoD and USAID changed daily. At the 
start there was no clear distinction of responsibilities between the two, or between 
other businesses and agencies.  In spite of the needs assessment for water, food, 
shelters, heavy equipment, and fuel, there was no guidance as to which agency 
would meet the requirements (SOUTHCOM-3, 2010). Another coordination issue 
was that supporting contracting and logistics personnel were not integrated in the 
operation-planning phase.  Yoder (2010) designates the planning phase as “phase 
zero.”  Phase zero is part of the deliberate planning process and crisis action 
planning, and requires development of integrative plans for contracting and logistics 
support.  Over the last two decades, only logisticians (J-4) developed robust plans, 
with contracting virtually non-existent in the process (Yoder, 2010).  Because, the 
need to involve contracting personnel at the OPLAN level was not perceived, only 
logisticians were involved in OPLAN development. Reasons for this could be 
because the local contracting effort is considered a USAID activity during 
contingencies.   
Contracting at the local level was not SOUTHCOM’s primary responsibility in 
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required for debris clearing. Due to extreme conditions, local Haitian contractors 
could only provide a limited amount of the actual requirements.  The long contract 
award timelines and lack of pre-awarded (disaster response) contracts was due to 
the lack of coordination effort between logistics and contracting. Command and 
Control (C2) issues challenged logistics and contracting coordination efforts. 
Ineffective C2 and the difficulty involved in indentifying who was being supported 
and by whom, led to challenges in coordination between emergency and relief 
personnel and to delays in task assignments that resulted in a delay for essential 
supplies and services to be distributed to the affected population.  
One of the reasons that the coordination effort between logistics and 
contracting was marginalized was that there were practically no requirements for 
contracting support during the first critical hours of OUR.  Because combatant 
commanders usually do not have procurement authority, there was a delay in 
designating a lead contracting support component during the response phase of 
OUR.  This delay increased procurement lead times and costs and prolonged 
requirements delivery schedules. 
C. Contracting, Management and Oversight 
The pre-awarded contracts in place during OUR were IDIQ type contracts 
such as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Navy’s Global 
Contingency Logistics Contract (GCLS), the Global Contingency Construction 
Contract(GCCC)/Navy Facility Engineering Command (NAVFAC), the Air Force 
Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and the Navy’s Husbanding Contracts.  
Although these existing contract vehicles allowed for a fast response, to ensure that 
the contract covered the scope of work required, ideally, most of the contracts 
should have been reviewed and planned prior to the disaster. From a DoD 
perspective, there was no phase zero “deliberate planning process” with 
corresponding exercise and rehearsal of the germane OPLAN, in particular, the 
logistics and contracting annexes.  In essence, many of the Indefinite Delivery 
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and scope of these existing instruments were not well known until later in the 
operation.   Most of these contracts eventually became useful, but not in the first 
critical hours of OUR.  Also, executing the pre-existing contracts was very expensive 
(Obayuwana, S., & Lockett, E. 2011, March).  
Because the IDIQ contract vehicles were not well known during the initial 
response period, Firm Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts awarded to commercial sources 
were the main type of contract vehicle and protocol used during the response phase 
of OUR.  As outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12.207 (a), 
FFP contracts assign the government fewer risks than other forms of contracts, and 
allow for “streamlined” protocols when combined with commercial item acquisition 
provisions of FAR Parts 12, 13, and 18 (FAR, 2011).    
In Haiti, the exact type of items, quantities, and delivery requirements were 
unknown during the first critical hours, thus immediate utilization of IDIQ contracts 
was not possible.  However, IDIQ contracts and Blanket Purchase Agreements 
(BPA) provide a sound business approach to filling anticipated repetitive needs for 
supplies or services.   BPAs, for example, establish “charge accounts’’ with qualified 
sources of supply, preventing the writing of numerous individual purchase orders, 
which could be challenging during crisis situations such as the Haiti earthquake.  
However, because the identification of commodity and service providers, and the 
identification of actual requirements, were unknown, establishing these instruments 
was not practical in the initial response during phase one.  
In Haiti, there was little or no competition, as mandated by the Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA) and FAR Part 6, because most of the local contractors were 
displaced and/or disoriented by the earthquake.  There were very few qualified 
contractors available and willing to compete for, and provide, supplies and services.  
If competition existed, it resulted in the vendors working as one team (SOUTHCOM-
1, 2010), which under normal circumstances would be classified as “collusion” (FAR, 
2005, Part 3.3), and would be grounds to disqualify the contractors involved.  
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the directives in FAR Part 6.302, which permits contracting without full and open 
competition under documented “urgent and compelling” circumstances.  This 
provision allows for a more rapid contracting response in order to get resources to 
the customers in a timely manner (Yoder, 2010). 
Simplified Acquisition Procedure (SAP), IDIQ, BPA, and Letter Contracts 
were used for contracting methods and procedures in Haiti (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).  
However, during the immediate response in phase one, the primary contract vehicle 
was individually awarded FFP contracts.  
The Army Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) was deployed and on 
Haitian soil within 48 hours of the initial earthquake.  The ECC established the Joint 
Acquisition Board (JAB) to aid in requirements determination and in vetting larger 
dollar value requests for prioritization, potential consolidation, and determination of 
best protocols.  The ECC also brought battlefield management tools, developed for 
Iraq operations, to the relief effort. For example, the Synchronized Pre-deployment 
and Operational Tracker (SPOT) provided contractor identification and control.  In 
Haiti, SPOT was set up to track contractors’ movements and activities.  All 
contractors were required to provide data input to SPOT within 5 days of contract 
award.  However, implementing SPOT in Haiti was very difficult due to the chaos 
created by the disaster, and the lack of mature infrastructure to allow for timely 
updates.  Contractors and some DoD personnel also lacked training, and SPOT 
guidelines were not easy to follow.   
Overall, there were contract administration, management, and oversight 
processes as well as Quality Assurance (QA) in place during the Haiti disaster 
response operation.  But it was not until the later phases of the operation that they 
were fully established.  The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) representatives, chartered with 
responsibility for contract management, oversight, and auditing, were marginally 
involved in the SOUTHCOM contingency planning phase.  However, they had 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 22 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
they only attended daily operations meetings to provide counseling and guidance. 
These meetings were termed “Contract Community Boards (CCB).”  Their expertise 
was not utilized for Haiti’s contract administration because there was supposedly no 
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IV. Analysis 
The cause for ineffective contracting and logistics support within the first 
critical hours of the 2010 Haiti disaster can be traced to three primary factors: Needs 
Assessment and Delivery (NAD); coordination effort through command, control, and 
communications (C3); and contracting award, oversight, and management as 
described in the previous section.  More positively, these observations offer lessons 
promoting better readiness in logistics and contracting support when a future 
disaster strikes. We believe that the delay in establishing functioning C3 was an 
overarching contributor to the DoD’s less-than-effective response effort in Haiti.  The 
delayed establishment of C3 hindered communications among DoD responders. 
This resulted in degraded or sub-optimized contracting and logistics coordination 
and provision.  
Establishing a fully functional command center in Haiti was delayed.  In a joint 
environment, it is critical that a fully functional temporary command post is 
established in the forward operating area within 96 hours of an operation 
(SOUTHCOM, 2010).  We believe the time frame must be within 48 hours for 
planning purposes. The Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) system, 
embedded with an early entry configuration, enables a commander to rapidly deploy 
such a command, which was not the case in Haiti.  Although the DJC2 arrived in 
Haiti within 48 hours of OUR, it was not fully functional until 10 days into OUR, due 
largely in part to the heavy debris and harsh environmental conditions from the initial 
immaturity of the nation and then from the subsequent earthquake (SOUTHCOM, 
2010).  The delay adversely impacted the synchronization of efforts between 
planners, operators, and subordinate commands during the critical phase of the 
operation. 
In the Haiti disaster, humanitarian logistics in SOUTHCOM suffered in terms 
of provision of critical supplies and services.  Because the C3 center (DJC2) for the 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 24 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
until ten days into the operation, the logistics function suffered because the CCO 
had to depend on the host embassy and other agencies for critical information.   
Lack of supply-chain security proved disruptive and added to the chaos, and 
had negative effects on logistics and contract management.  Although organically 
inherent characteristics of the host nation (governance, economic, infrastructure) 
cannot be rapidly changed, adverse affects can be mitigated or even avoided if 
prepositioning processes are in place.  Here, one of the most important steps in 
prepositioning is establishing command, control, and communication for fundamental 
support with logistics and contracting personnel.  Some of the resources necessary 
for CCO depend on the scale and scope of the contracting effort, the operational 
picture of contracting available, and the oversight of such contracts. Inadequate 
command and control functionality has to be mitigated using the usual and traditional 
Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time and Civil  METT-TC analysis phases in 
establishing the contingency contracting deployment package. 
 
Figure 2. Capability Gaps Have Detrimental Effects 
(GAO, 2011) 
The 2010 Haiti earthquake emphasizes certain challenges in humanitarian 
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supplies, critical time-windows, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and vast scope and size 
of the operations. Some  parallel challenges in contingency contracting are statutory 
and regulatory compliance (CICA, FAR, etc.), lack of surge capacity in contracting 
organizations, critical response time at odds with procurement lead times, uncertain 
scope and size of requirements, and coordination amongst requirements generators, 
providers, and contracting personnel.   
As Figure 2 indicates, in most disasters, including Haiti, the relief and aid 
resources provided often lag behind actual requirements (GAO, 2011).  We contend 
that with proper integration of logistics and contracting in the planning phases prior 
to an actual emergency, the “capability gap” and corresponding response time can 
be minimized.   
Integrating logistics and contracting is one of the key factors for creating 
effective response.  Prepositioning may be viewed in terms of traditional logistics 
material stocks and in more advanced contingency contracting circles as having 
advance awarded contracts in place. No response can be efficient unless 
appropriate supplies and provisions are available and properly distributed. Many 
relief agencies tend to have purchasing agreements with companies that provide 
many of these disaster relief supplies. However, the gap may be within the 
coordination between the capabilities of logistics agencies and the contracting 
community. 
 Integrated logistics and contracting planning can be achieved by exploring 
methods to improve pre-planning in contingency contracting to complement logistics 
planning by shifting response capability earlier to minimize lag and gaps.  Such 
methods include, but are not limited to, utilizing existing statutes and regulations 
under the provisions of 10 USC formal declaration of a contingency, meeting CICA 
and other mandates via IDIQ and Multiple Award Contract (MAC) methodologies 
and vehicles, and exploiting authorized protocols of FAR Parts 13 and 18, which are 
all designed to improve effectiveness.  Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook, 
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provisions. Additional possibilities are exploring methods to improve response 
posture in logistics and contracting through “reach-back” and other capabilities.  
Applying these measures early on—integrating contracting, logistics, and other 
components early in planning during phase zero within the Deliberate Planning 
Process, exercising and rehearsing CONPLAN and OPLAN responses, and tailoring 
response packages to the scope, size, and nature of the actual crisis event—will 
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V. Conclusion 
We studied the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake for the first critical 
period of 100 hours. Our observations directed us to conduct further analysis to 
understand what influential factors existed for the integration of logistics and 
contracting to provide efficient and effective humanitarian support when a disaster 
strikes. Our analysis guided us to the following conclusions.    
First, the DoD must establish the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) and 
supporting staff for contracting (Yoder, 2010), and the Logistics Task Team (LTT; 
Obayuwana & Lockett, 2011).  These functional units must be strategically placed 
within planning cells at the services and combatant commands.  These IPE and LTT 
functional groups will work to fully integrate contracting and logistics in phase zero 
before disaster strikes.  Each team member of the IPE and LTT will create a 
comprehensive response plan, exercise and rehearse it, and be responsible for 
implementation in case a disaster strikes.  Such planning ahead of time will help in 
executing as well as in managing disaster response operations. 
The participating members of the IPE and LTT must be credentialed and 
certified so that the team members can assist with contracting efforts in phase zero 
and beyond. Most important, the IPE and LTT can plan and develop logistics and 
contracting support as well as recommend specific service component actions such 
as pre-awarded contracts for effective disaster response operations.  Any capability 
gaps in logistics can be identified in phase zero exercises with corresponding gaps 
filled by contracting. The credentials and certification will help optimize the logistics 
and contracting support to operational readiness for disaster response.  
In conclusion, the creation and utilization of fully integrated logistics and 
contracting in the non-crisis planning stages of the Deliberate Planning Process will 
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disasters and emergencies.   The result of integration is greater effectiveness—by 
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